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Simple Games on Networks
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In the same way that traditional game theory captured the minds of economists and allowed
complex problems to be studied using simple models, so have games on networks come to be
used in computer science. In particular, previous work has focused on extending a two-player
base game M over a network G by having each vertex in G chose a strategy from the base
game and play it simultaneously against all adjacent nodes. Similarly, the utility for each vertex
becomes the sum of the utility of that node in each of the games it plays against its neighbors.
The resulting networked game is called M ⊕ G. This paper seeks to augment the body of
existing work by studying a few similar networked games and finding key characteristics like the
existence of Nash equilibria, the price of anarchy, the price of stability, the convergence speed
of best response dynamic, and the difficulty of finding the optimal solution. We also reproduce
the result that the class of exact potential games is isomorphic to the class of congestion games
with a proof that is drastically more readable than the original.
1 Introduction
As the internet has grown, so has our fascination with networks in general. The interactions
that occur within social networks seem especially compelling, as such networks represent the first
time picture of human interaction that seems relatively complete and can be studied rigorously.
To model these interactions, scientists have turned to game theory, making the class of graphical
games [7] a natural target for research. Here, we consider several different games on networks.
Originally defined and analyzed in [3], the Matching Game serves as a useful jumping off point for
considering a new game where players receive utility by playing a strategy that is distinct from
their opponents. Known as the Mismatching Game, this paper studies many core facets of the
game including the existence of Nash equilibria, the price of anarchy [8], the price of stability [1],
the computability of the optimal solution, and the convergence of best response dynamics. We
also introduce a second new game, the Affiliation Game, which is a hybrid of the Matching and
Mismatching games and a natural extension of correlation clustering [4] [2] to game theory. This
model also generalizes models of the party affiliation game introduced by Fabrikant et.al [5] and
Balcan et. al. [1]
Finally, when attempting to analyze the convergence speed of best response dynamics, we came
across the complexity class PLS [6] [11]. Existing work introduced the class of congestion games
[10] and proved that every potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game [9]. In [5], the
authors further prove that finding the optimal solution for many kinds of congestion games is
PLS-Complete, and therefore have initial configurations that require an exponential number of
best response rounds to converge to a Nash equilibrium. In seeking to better understand how our
games fit into the class of congestion games, we attempted to follow the construction used in [9],
but found it both incomprehensible and incorrect. The final section of the paper rectifies these
mistakes and simplifies both the notation and the construction used to prove the result.
2 Definitions and Models
2.1 Terms
A game has a set N of n players where n ≥ 2. Each player i has a set Si consisting of k strategies
that i can play. A state of the game, or outcome, is an n−tuple s = (s1, s2, ..., sn) that encodes the
strategy used by each player. States can also be notated as (si, s−i) which singles out a particular
player i using strategy si from the rest of the players using strategies s−i. The utility function for
player i ui(si, s−i) takes into account the player’s strategy, as well as the strategies used by every
other player in the game. A best response move is the strategy si that maximizes player i’s utility
function given that every other player is fixed. Drawing on this notion, best response dynamics
(BRD) refers to the process of allowing players to make best response moves in sequence. A Nash
equilibrium is an outcome where no single player has any incentive to change strategies, or for
any player i playing strategy si, ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i) ∀ s′i ∈ Si. When a Nash Equilibrium
is reached via best response dynamics, we say that BRD has converged or terminated. In order
to analyze the quality of an outcome, we need an optimal solution. Our optimal solution will
always maximize the sum of all player’s utilities, so the best outcome is the state s that maximizes∑
i∈N ui(s), also known as the Social Welfare. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) for a game is the ratio
of the Nash equilibrium with the lowest value to the optimal solution. This is frequently used a
measure of how bad an outcome could be if best response dynamics were allowed to complete.
Similar to the Price of Anarchy, the Price of Stability (PoS ) for a game is the ratio of the Nash
equilibrium with the highest value to the optimal solution. A potential function Φ(s) for a game is
a function that maps game states to numbers such that, for any two states that differ in only one
player’s strategy (si, s−i) and (s
′
i, s−i), the change in the potential function Φ(si, s−i)−Φ(s′i, s−i)
is equal to the change in i’s utility ui(si) − ui(s′i). The networks used by games will always be a
graph G = (V,E) consists of a set of vertices V and a set of edges E, where each edge connects
exactly two vertices. We will assume unless otherwise specified that there is at most one edge
between any pair of vertices and no edges from a vertex to itself.
2.2 Models
Games
In the Matching Game there are n players N = {1, 2, ..., n} and k strategies S = {1, 2, ..., k}. Each
player shares the same set of strategies and has the same utility function. Let δx be the number
players using strategy x, then for every player u we define u(i, s−u) = viδ
i, or the number of players
using a strategy times the value of that strategy. Without loss of generality we always order the
strategies such that 0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vk. The Mismatching Game uses a very similar setup with




or the number of players not using strategy i times the value of that strategy.
Superimposing a Network
Adding a network to a game M means adding to the model a graph G = (V,E) where |V | = n.
We notate this M ⊕ G. Each vertex in the graph represents a player and each edge corresponds
to an instance of the game M . The strategies in M ⊕G are the same as the strategies in G and
for a player u, if δ(u) is the set of nodes adjacent to u and vu(s) is u’s utility function in M ,
then the utility of u in M ⊕ G is uu(s) =
∑
v∈δ vu(su, sv) where u and v play strategies su and
sv respectively. From here on it is assumed that every game is played on some underlying graph G.
The Affiliation Game is only played on networks and is an attempt to merge the Matching and
Mismatching games. Given a set of n vertices, we require that the graph G on those vertices be
complete and consist of either positive or negative edges. Positive edges correspond to instances of
the Matching Game, while negative edges are instances of the Mismatching Game. The result is
similar to the Party Affiliation game with an arbitrary number k of distinctly weighted strategies
{v1...vk} where v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vk. Even though players may engage in two different kinds of
games, we assume that the underlying Matching and Mismatching games share the same set of
strategies, so each vertex is still playing exactly one strategy in each game.
3 The Matching Game
All of the following results apply to the Matching Game on networks, as described above.
3.1 Convergence
Lemma 1. When G is a path or cycle, Best Response Dynamics converges in at most k−1 rounds.
Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. Note that if a player switches to a strategy as a best response, then they must have at least
one neighbor already playing that strategy, or else there would be no reason to switch. Because of
this, and because each player has at most two neighbors, once a player has chosen some strategy
a as a best response, it will never be a best response for that player to play any strategy b where
vb ≤ va. Consider what would happen if this were not the case. Then let i be the first player who
switches to a strategy of a lower value after making at least one other best response move. When
i first played strategy a, i had at least one neighbor playing a, so if i’s best response is now b, i’s
neighbor must have changed strategies and because i is the first player to switch to a lower valued
strategy, i’s neighbor must have switched to a strategy of greater value. Therefore i has one neigh-
bor playing a strategy c where vc > va ≥ vb, meaning that i would get more utility playing c than
b, so b cannot be i’s best response. Therefore no player can switch strategies more than k−1 times.
To construct a tight example, consider the case where k = n and each vertex in the path
of length k plays the strategy that corresponds to their position in that path. If players take
turns from right to left, then the leftmost player will eventually play every strategy in the game,
requiring k − 1 rounds.
Lemma 2. When G is complete, BRD converges in one round.
Proof. Note that because the graph is complete, every player has the same best response move.
Therefore the strategy chosen by the first player who moves will be the same strategy chosen by
every other player. Similar logic is at work in Lemma 3.
3.2 Anarchy
Lemma 3. When G is a complete graph, the Price of Anarchy is vkv1
Proof. It is sufficient to show that any stable solution requires every player to use the same strategy.
Consider an instance in which two vertices p and q are playing different strategies. Because the
graph is complete, both p and q share all of their other neighbors. Without loss of generality,
assume that p is playing strategy i and getting at least as much utility as q. Then q has an
incentive to switch because q would receive the same utility as p plus vi. Because no assumptions
were made about p or q, this argument holds for every mismatched pair of players.
4 The Mismatching Game
4.1 Optimality
Theorem 4. Finding the optimal solution to an instance of the Networked Mismatch Game
(NMG) is NP-Hard, even when k = 2.
Proof. We can prove this by showing that a special case of NMG is sufficient to solve the graph
coloring problem. In particular, given a graph coloring instance on a graph G with k colors, we
let each color represent a unique strategy in NMG and let all strategies here have the same value.
Therefore, the optimal solution to NMG represents the coloring of G where as few neighbors as
possible share the same color. If this were not the case (i.e. if there were some coloring that had
fewer same-colored adjacent neighbors) then the solution would not be optimal for NMG because
greater total utility would have been available using that coloring. Hence, the optimal solution
represents the best possible coloring of G with k colors. Note that the chromatic number of a
graph is never more than the maximum degree of the graph plus one. Then, by varying the number
of strategies, k using a binary search technique, this reduction can be used to find the chromatic
number of G.
Furthermore, if k = 2 and both strategies have the same value, the optimal solution to NMG on
G is also the solution to the max cut problem. Because there are only two strategies, the optimal
solution will maximize the number of edges e = (v1, v2) where v1 and v2 are vertices playing
different strategies. This can be used to create the max cut by selecting the vertices playing each
strategy as subsets of G - the edges crossing this cut represent the total utility of the solution.
Because utility was maximized, so was the number of edges crossing the cut, hence this has solved
the max cut problem.
4.2 Convergence
Theorem 5. Mismatch games on networks have an exact potential function
Let δ(a) be the set of neighbors of a vertex a. Then given a strategy profile (sa, s−a) the





va if sb = sa
vb + va otherwise.
Proof.
To prove that this is correct, there are three cases. For each case, we will assume that some player
a is switching from strategy x to strategy y and that his neighbor b is playing strategy z. Note
that when x = y = z this is trivial because nothing has changed.
Case 1: x 6= z, y 6= z
Before the change, a is getting vx after the change, a is getting vy. The difference in a’s utility is
then vx − vy, but the change in Φ is vx + vz − (vy + vz) = vx − vy.
Case 2: x = z, y 6= z
The change in a’s utility is −vy and the change in Φ is vz − (vz + vy) = −vy.
Case 3: x 6= z, y = z
The change in a’a utility is vx and the change in Φ is vx + vz − vz = vx.
Because the change in Φ mirrors the change in a’s utility on each edge whenever a changes
strategies, Φ accurately describes the change in potential for any deviating player on any graph.
Lemma 6. Best Response Dynamics converges in at most n steps when G is a complete graph
Proof. Note that because the graph is complete, for a given configuration, each player has the
same best response move. Then let the first player p who moves choose strategy i. By definition,
p cannot get any more utility at the moment. Furthermore, p’s utility is only affected negatively
when some other player switches to strategy i - but when that happens, because each player has
the same best response move, it is still p’s best response to play i. The same argument holds for
any player, any strategy, and any timeframe. Therefore, because a player never has an incentive
to deviate from the first best response move they make, each player will move at most once before
the game reaches an equilibrium.
Lemma 7. BRD converges in at most 2 rounds when G is a cycle or a path
Proof. Note that because each vertex has degree at most two, there are effectively only two cases.
In the first case, either k = 2 or vk > 2vk−2 meaning that only two strategies will ever be used.
The second case is the converse of the first, k ≥ 3 and vk < 2vk−2 so the top three strategies are
all viable. We say a player is stable when their best response can never change.
Case 1: Let each player make one best response move in any order, by hypothesis each player is
now playing either strategy k or k− 1. Now let each player take another turn. Consider a player,
p, who switched from strategy k to k−1. If that was the case, then because vk ≥ vk−1, both of p’s
neighbors must have been playing k. Now, because both of p’s neighbors are playing k and have
at least one neighbor playing k − 1, both neighbors are stable, as is p. This means that after a
single round of best response moves, the only move that can be made is from k− 1 to k, and that
can happen only once. Therefore the game has reached a Nash after at most two rounds of BRD.
Case 2: Again, let each player make a single best response move so that every player is playing k,
k − 1 or k − 2, and again allow each player to make a second move. The table below summarizes
the possibilities for the second round.
Neighbors Play Best Response
k − 2,k − 2 k
k − 2,k − 1 k
k − 2,k k − 1
k − 1,k − 1 k
k − 1,k k − 2
k,k k − 1
Note that if a player’s best response is k, then neither of their neighbors are currently playing
k and furthermore, k will never be a best response for either neighbor. Therefore anyone playing
k is stable. Now consider a player p whose best response was k − 1 and note that because k − 1
was a best response, p must have at least one neighbor playing k. If p’s best response were to
become k, then p’s neighbor who was playing k must have changed strategies, which is impossible.
Furthermore if p’s best response were to become k− 2, then because we know that any neighbors
playing k would not have switched, p must have had a neighbor q who switched from k − 2 to
k − 1, but q’s best response could never be k − 1 because q is a neighbor to p and p is already
playing k − 1. Therefore, in the second round of BRD, only players whose first best response was
k − 2 will ever move, and having moved once, they will be stable. Hence BRD will converge in at
most two rounds.
4.3 Anarchy and Stability







Proof. Let δi(u) be the number of neighbors of some vertex u playing a strategy i and δ(u) be
the degree of u. Then if u plays strategy i, u receives a payoff pu = vi(δ(u) − δi(u)). For any
Nash equilibrium, pu ≥ vi(δ(u)− δi(u)) ∀i because the actual payoff received by any player must
be at least as large as the payoff the player would receive by changing strategies. Dividing both

















for any player u in equilibrium. Taking the sum over all














is the number of edges in the graph.
Because there is a non-zero payoff on any edge only when the strategies played by adjacent players
are distinct, the maximum value attainable on any edge given that the strategies have been ordered
such that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vk is vk + vk−1. The value can be obtained on every edge if and only
if G is bipartite. So for a general graph G, the value of the optimal solution (OPT ) is at most














and when the bound is tight,




















, it will be useful to transform this inequality before proceeding














Now let n be total number of players on one half of a complete bipartite graph, so that every vertex
has degree n. Also let ni be the number of players on one side of the graph playing strategy i. Note
that it does not matter which side of the graph we consider, because if there exists an equilibrium
for a complete bipartite graph, there exists a symmetric equilibrium, and we will assume without
loss of generality that this is the case. At equilibrium, in the worst case, each player receives the
same payoff with each strategy so vi(n− ni) = vj(n− nj) for all pairs of strategies i and j. Now




i βi = 1
ii. βi = 1− vjvi (1− βj)
Note that i. is necessary for βi to be a percentage and ii. follows from the requirement that the
payoffs for each strategy be equal.














Note that each β has a common denominator, so
∑













i 6=q vi. The left side of this equation has each combination of k − 1 vi terms represented
exactly once. The right side has k−2 terms of every value except one and one term of every other
k − 1 combination. There are k terms in the summation, which means that each combination of
k − 1 values appears exactly k − 1 times positively and k − 2 times negatively, canceling to equal




























































































Cancel a common term
Furthermore, note that (1) implies (k − 2)
∏




j 6=i vj because v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vk
so βi is positive exactly when (1) holds, which means that the bound on the Price of Anarchy is
tight when (1) holds. When (1) does not hold, it means that strategy 1 will never be used by any
player on any graph so the Price of Anarchy is tight to the bound in Theorem 1 for the smallest i
such that {vi...vk} satisfies (1).
Proof. (⇒)
Let ni be the number of players playing strategy i. If the bound on the Price of Anarchy is
tight, then because the bound incorporates each of the values v1...vk, a solution which obtains the
bound must utilize every strategy. If that were not the case, then one or more strategies could
be removed, which would change the bound on the Price of Anarchy but would not change the
solution. Therefore ni > 0 ∀i. For all strategies to be viable in equilibrium, it must be possible for
all strategies to obtain parity with every other strategy simultaneously. For example, given three
strategies with values 1, 2, and 3, a player v choosing strategy 1 must be able to get as much profit
as someone playing 2 or 3. In order for this to be possible, at least half of v’s neighbors must be
playing 2 and at least 23 of v’s neighbors must be playing 3. This is clearly impossible. In general,
for a vertex v of degree δ(v) playing strategy 1, v’s payoff is at most v1δ(v), which happens when
v’s neighbors are all playing strategies other than 1. In that case, it will be profitable for v to
stick with strategy 1 as long as v1δ(v) ≥ vi(δ(v) − δi(v)) ∀i. Expanding and dividing each term
















), but because δ(v) =
∑
i δ

















, β1 = 0





















































































and factor (k − 2)
= 0 The terms in the numerator cancel
Because β1 is zero at equality, and our bound on the Price of Anarchy requires that all strategies
be used in the worst case example, if the bound is tight, then the inequality must be strict.





for even n and
(n− 1)(n+ 1)(v2 + 1)2
4(v2n− 1)(n− 1)
for odd n.
Lemma 13. If G is complete and k = 2, the optimal solution to the NMG has value n
2(v1+v2)
4 for
even n and (n−1)(n+1)(v1+v2)4 for odd n.
Proof. Let n1 be the number of people playing strategy 1 and n2 be the number of people playing
strategy 2. Then note that the value of any solution is exactly n1v1n2 + n2v2n1 = n1n2(v1 + v2)
because this represents the number of people playing strategy 1, each of whom gets v1 utility from
n2 other players and the number of people playing strategy 2 who each receive v2 utility from n1
players. Because n1 + n2 = n this can also be written as n1(n − n1)(v1 + v2), which has n1 as
a single variable. Elementary calculus tells us that the product n1(n − n1) is maximized when
n1 =
n
2 . When n is odd,
n
2 is not integral, so we use the closest integral approximation. The result




2 (v1 + v2) =
n2(v1+v2)
4 . The odd case is the same,
letting n1 =
n−1
2 and n2 =
n+1
2 .
Lemma 14. If G is complete, k = 2, and v1 is normalized to one, then the worst Nash Equilibrium
will have value at least (v2n+1)(n−1)v2+1 .
Proof. As shown above, the optimal solution on this kind of graph splits players as equally as
possible between the two strategies. The worst case, therefore, would be the stable solution with
the greatest imbalance in the number of players. Because v2 ≥ v1, it will never be stable for more
players to play strategy one then strategy two. Therefore we consider the solution where as many
players as possible play strategy 2. In order to be a Nash Equilibrium, it must be the case that for
any player using strategy 1, v1n2 ≥ v2(n1 − 1); in other words, strategy 1 is their best response.
Substituting n − n1 for n2 allows us to solve for n1 yielding n1 ≥ v1(n−1)v1+v2 . Because n1 + n2 = n,
this means that n2 ≤ v2n+v1v1+v2 with the worst case (in terms of total value) happening when these
inequalities are tight. Therefore, if we normalize v1 to be 1
min (value) = n1n2(v1 + v2) Definition of value


















Theorem 12 follows directly from dividing the optimal result obtained in Lemma 13 by the worst
case result obtained in Lemma 14.
Theorem 15. The Price of Stability for any set of values can be as good as 1 and as bad as the
Price of Anarchy, depending on the graph.
Lemma 16. When G = Kn, k = 2, and nv1 < v2, the Price of Anarchy is the same as the Price
of Stability.
Proof. Recall that Kn is the complete graph on n vertices. Let n1 be the number of people playing
strategy 1 and n2 be the number of people playing strategy 2. The social welfare in this case is
(n − n1)(n − n2)v1 + (n − n2)(n − n1)v2 = (n − n1)(n − n2)(v1 + v2) which is maximized when
n1 = n2 =
n
2 . Therefore, the optimal solution will always split players evenly between both strate-
gies for a total value of n
2
4 (v1+v2). Note that this depends in no way on the value of the strategies
involved.
The only stable solution on Kn for the given values occurs when n− 1 players play strategy 2
and one player plays strategy 1. Consider a situation in which two players, a and b, and playing
strategy 1. Each of them receives a payoff of (n− 2)v1. But if a switches to strategy 2, a receives
v2. Since v2 > nv1 > (n−2)v1 a has an incentive to change. The same is true whenever more play-
ers are playing strategy 1 because that only increases the benefit accrued by switching to strategy 2.
The stable solution described above will have a value of (n−1)(v1+v2) meaning that the Price






. Looking at the limit as n approaches infinity this gives a ratio
of 4n or about
1
n . Note that in this case the Price of Stability is the same as the Price of Anarchy
because there is only one Nash Equilibrium.
Lemma 17. When G is bipartite, the Price of Stability is one.
Proof. For any set of values satisfying (1), the Price of Anarchy on a complete bipartite graph
is given by Theorem 8. The optimal solution has one half of the graph playing strategy k and
the other half playing strategy k − 1. Because these are the two best strategies, no person has
an incentive to deviate, meaning that the optimal solution is stable and the Price of Stability is
1.
5 The Affiliation Game
5.1 Potential
Theorem 18. The Affiliation Game has an exact potential function
Proof. Note that both the matching game (see [3]) and the mismatching game have exact potential
functions, Φ+ and Φ−, defined in terms of the change on each edge. On each edge, the potential
function for the general affiliation game uses whichever potential function is applicable for that
edge (i.e. Φ+ on all positive edges). Because the component potential functions accurately describe
the change in overall utility created by each edge they are applied to, the sum over all of these
changes accurately reflects the total change in utility of the affiliation game.
5.2 Anarchy and Stability
In any graph G(V,E) let m− be the number of negative edges in G and m+ be the number of
positive edges in G so that m− +m+ = m = |E|.
Lemma 19. Given a set of values {v1...vk}, the maximum value for the Price of Anarchy in any







Proof. This proof follows exactly the same steps as the proofs on the upper bounds on the Price
of Anarchy for the Matching and Mismatching games.
Let maxG(PoA) be the maximum value for the Price of Anarchy on any graph with a fixed set
of values in the Affiliation Game. The corollary below follows directly by trying to maximize the
ratio in Lemma 19, which results in m− becoming zero. Unfortunately, this bound is not tight, as
shown in Lemma 21.





Lemma 21. When m− = 0, the Price of Anarchy is
vk
v1
Proof. Because there are no negative edges, this is really an instance of the matching game on a
complete graph. In the matching game, the optimal solution has every player playing vk. It is
then sufficient to show that no stable solution can use more than one strategy. Consider some
configuration that uses two strategies, i and j played by groups of players A and B, respectively.
Note that if players in A get a better payoff than players in B then every player in B has an
incentive to play i. Similarly, if players in B get more payoff, then every player in A has an
incentive to deviate to j. Finally, if A and B both receive equal payoffs, then every player has
an incentive to deviate because they would receive an additional vi or vj utility, respectively.
Therefore stable solutions will use only a single strategy. Finally, it is clear that once every player
is using the same strategy, no player has an incentive to deviate, because deviating yields no payoff.
Therefore in the worst equilibrium, every player plays strategy 1, because it has the lowest value.
The desired ratio follows directly from the definition of Price of Anarchy.
For the following two lemmas, let G be a graph with 2n vertices. Vertices are arranged in pairs
(groups) connected by a positive edge. Each set of pairs has negative edges to every other vertex.
Then let x and y be strategies where x ≥ y.
Lemma 22. In any optimal solution to the affiliation game on this graph, positively connected
pairs play the same strategy.
Proof. Let a and b be a mismatching pair. Without loss of generality, let a play x and b be play y.
a’s contribution to the total value of the solution is currently (x+ y)ny where ny is the number of
players playing y because each edge between a and a vertex playing y yields x+ y utility between
the two vertices involved. If a were to switch and play y instead, a would provide (x+ y)nx + 2y
to the social welfare. Symmetrically b can either contribute (x+ y)nx or (x+ y)ny + 2x. Because
it must true that either nx ≥ ny or ny ≥ nx, one player can always be switched while increasing
the total social welfare. The same argument holds for any mismatching positively connected pair.
Lemma 23. The optimal solution to the affiliation game on this graph divides paired groups equally
between strategies.
Proof. Because of the above lemma, it is sufficient to show that deviating the number of groups
from an equal distribution yields a lower total value for the solution. Let nx be the total num-
ber of groups playing x and ny be the total number of groups playing y. Note that each group
playing x in contributes 2x + 4xny to the social welfare because each member of the group re-
ceives x for matching their partner and 2xny for mismatching each group playing y. Similarly,
each y group contributes 2y + 4ynx. The total value of the proposed optimal solution is therefore
n






2 ) = yn+ yn
2 + xn+ xn2.
Now let n+m2 groups play y for some −n < m < n. This new solution has a value of y(n+m)+
y(n+m)(n−m) + x(n−m) + x(n−m)(n+m) = yn+ ym+ yn2− ym2 + xn+ xm+ xn2− xm2.
Because m2 ≥ m for all m, this new solution has no better value than the original (where m = 0).
Theorem 24. The Price of Stability on a general graph is not one
Proof. This proof will use the graph below. Each edge shown is a positive edge, the absence of an
edge implies a negative edge.
We will use two strategies called 1 and 2, with values 1 and 2, respectively. Note that the
graph is similar to but not exactly the same as the graph for lemmas 22 and 23. It is then
sufficient to show that the optimal solution is not the same as the best stable solution. Solutions




. By an argument similar to that in Lemma 22, a and b and d and e will
play the same strategy in any optimal solution. This fact and symmetry narrow down the viable























Let V (si) be the social value of solution si. The table below summarizes the results.
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
V (si) 33 30 32 23 30 28 29
s1 is not stable, however, because c can obtain a utility of four instead of three by playing strategy
2. Verifying that s3 is stable is simple - neither a nor c has an incentive to deviate, and symmetry
does the rest. Therefore, the Price of Stability on this graph with this strategy set is 3332 , which is
not one.
5.3 Observational Results
The following observations were made using a program to simulate the effects of best response
dynamics over all possible graphs and a small set of strategies. The project is broken into four
files. Graphmaker takes a number of nodes and a number of positive weight (matching) edges,
and uses that to construct all possible complete graphs with that many vertices and positive
edges. Graphsolver takes a filename prefix and a number of files that contain graphs and finds
all nash equilibria and the optimal solution by testing every possible starting configuration and
allowing best response dynamics to converge, testing the solution for optimality along the way.
Run.sh is a script that, given a target number of players, runs graphmaker and graphsolver for
every possible graph and edge distribution up to the target number of players. Combs is a simple
program that outputs some combinatorics calculations, enabling run.sh to figure out how many
graphs graphmaker produced. The source code has been included as a separate document.
i. The Price of Anarchy is substantially lower than the predicted bound given by Lemma 19.
ii. The Price of Anarchy decreases as the graph goes from being all matching edges to all
mismatching edges.
iii. The Price of Stability is very low (lower than 1.1 across all test cases).
iv. Best Response Dynamics converges quickly on average (less than n) and moderately quickly
in the worst case, though the relationship between n and the worst case is unclear.
v. Best Response Dynamics converges faster as the graph goes from being all matching edges
to all mismatching edges.
6 Potential Games
This proof originally appeared in [9] in an almost incomprehensible form. The proof below uses a
heavily refined version of their construction.
Theorem 25. Every exact potential game is isomorphic to a congestion game.
Proof.
Formally, a congestion game C as defined in [9] has a set of players N = {1, 2, ..., n}, a set of
facilities M = {1, 2, ..., `}, and a set of strategies Σi for every player i where each strategy is a
non-empty set of facilities. Further, let vi be the utility function for a player i in the congestion
game. Then for each facility j ∈M , let cj(r) be the cost incurred for r people using facility j. If
player i plays a strategy consisting of a set of facilities A, vi =
∑
j∈A cj(rj) where rj is the number
of players actually using facility j. As seems intuitive, i’s utility is exactly the total cost of each
facility used by i.
There is, however, an alternative way of expressing the same idea - in particular, one can break
down the costs into groups based on the number of people using each facility so that the total
cost to i is the sum of the number facilities that only i is using times the cost for one player to
use those facilities plus the number of facilities that i and one other player are using times the
cost for two players to use those facilities, etc.. To represent this algebraically, we need a way of
expressing the set of facilities played by player i and others.
For any subset of players Y , let Y c denote the complement of Y and R(Y ) be the facilities
used by the players in Y . Finally, let R(Y )c be the facilities not used by the players in Y . Then,
using i and {i} interchangeably, the facilities played by only player i are R(i) ∩R(ic)c. Similarly,
the facilities used by everyone are R(1) ∩ R(2) ∩ ... ∩ R(n). There are other terms that make up










Given a potential game, let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players (as in the congestion game).
Recall that a state m in the potential game can be represented as a vector of length n, that is
one entry for each player, so m = (m1,m2, ...mn) where mi is the strategy that player i is using.
Using these definitions we will create an isomorphic congestion game.
In the congestion game there are two kinds of facilities, there is one facility α(i,m) for every
player i and every state m in the potential game and one facility β(m) for every state m. Then if
player i plays strategy mi in the potential game, they play the unique facilities β(m)and α(i,m).
Conversely, the strategies for player i in the congestion game are exactly the pairs of facilities
that share a common state m. From these definitions, it is clear that α(i,m) is a facility that
only i is going to play when the potential game is in state m, and β(m) is a facility that every
player will always play. This leads to equations (2) and (3). To completely squelch the possibil-
ity of interference by small groups of players playing the same facilities, we set cj(r) to be zero
for all 1 < r < n and all facilities j ∈ M . Now we wish to define cj(1) and cj(n) such that the
utility of a player in the congestion game is the same as the utility of a player in the potential game.
|R(i) ∩R(ic)c| = 1 (3)
|
⋂
h∈N R(h)| = 1 (4)
This is relatively simple given our notation, we simply let Φ be a potential function for the
potential game and then let cβ(m)(n) = Φ(m). In order to define cα(i,m)(1), we must first note
that the difference between the utility of a player and the potential of state does not depend
on the strategy the player is using because the difference in potential between two states that
differ in only one player’s strategy is exactly the change in utility for that player. Formally, if
a player i is playing strategy ma and switches to mb we have that u
i(ma,m−i) − Φ(ma,m−i) =
ui(mb,m−i) − Φ(mb,m−i). Hence, we define cα(i,m)(1) = ui(m) − Φ(m). Therefore the utility of










= cβ(m)(n) ∗ 1 + cα(i,m)(1) ∗ 1 By (2) and (3)
= ui(m)− Φ(m) + Φ(m) Def. of c(1) and c(n)
= ui(m).
7 Future Work
There are numerous questions in this realm that remain unanswered. One area that has not
been fully explored is the convergence time of best response dynamics in both the matching and
mismatching games as function of the underlying graph. Using a case analysis, we have shown
here that BRD converges quickly for very simple graphs and preliminary analysis of trees and
three-regular graphs indicates that both games should continue to have convergence times that
are at least sub-exponential if not constant. However, this analysis becomes increasingly complex
as the number of viable strategies increases. Perhaps the better questions to ask consider the
potential function. Where are the local maxima for this function? Does the function increase by
minimum amount with each best response move? Also, how do any of the games presented here fit
into the complexity class PLS? Answering these questions might allow for greater insight into the
convergence of BRD on a general graph. Another area in which our knowledge could be expanded
is the Price of Anarchy. How does the PoA in the mismatching game depend on the underlying
graph? Is there a tight bound for the Price of Anarchy in the affiliation game? If so, under what
circumstances is it tight? Finally, there are questions about the Price of Stability. Can we give a
better bound on the PoS in the mismatching game and relate that at all to graph structure? Can
we find any bound on the PoS in the affiliation game?
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